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Abstract 
We study interactive communication of knowledge from the point of view of resource-bounded 
computational complexity. Extending the work of Goldwasser. Micali. and Rackoff [16], we define a 
protocol transferring the result of any fixed computation to be minimum-knowledge if it communicates no 
additional knowledge to the recipient besides the intended computational result. We prove that such 
protocols may be combined in a natural way so as to build more complex protocols. 
We introduce a protocol for two parties, a prover and a verifier. with the following properties: 
1. Following the protocol, the prover gives to the verifier a proof of the value. 0 or 1, of a 
particular Boolean predicate which is (assumed to be) hard for the verifier to compute_ 
Such a deciding "interactive proof-system" extends the interactive proof-systems of [16], 
which arc only used to confirm that a certain predicate has value L 
2. The protocol is minimum-knowledge. 
3. The protocol is result-indistinguishable: an eavesdropper, overhearing an execution of the 
protocol, does not learn the value of the predicate that is proved. 
The value of the predicate is a cryptographically secure bit, shared by the two parties to the protocol. 
This security is achieved without the use of encryption functions, all messages being sent in the clear. 
These properties enable us to define a cryptosystem in which each user receives exactly the knowledge he 
is supposed to receive and nothing more. 
5 Supported in part by NSF grants MCS-8303139 and DCR-8511713. 
6 Supported in part by an IBM graduate fellowship. 
A preliminary version of this paper appeared as "A Private Interactive Test of a Boolean Predicate and 
Minimum-Knowledge Public-Key Cryptosystems," Proceedings of the 26th Symposium on the 
Foundations of Computer Science, IEEE, 1985, pages 360-371. Most of this work was done while all 
three authors were at Columbia University. 
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1. Introduction 
Transfer and exchange of knowledge is the basic task of any communication system. Recently, much 
attention has been given to the process of knowledge exchange in the context of distributed systems and 
cryptosystems. In particular, several authors have concentrated on problems associated with the 
interactive communication of proofs [16,1,22]. 
In [16] Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackorf developed a computational-complexity approach to the theory 
of knowledge; a message is said to convey knowledge if it contains information that is the result of a 
computation that is intractable for the receiver. They introduce the notion of an interactive proof-system 
for a language L. This is a protocol for two interacting probabilistic Turing machines, whereby one of 
them, the prover, proves to the other, the verifier, that an input string x is in fact (with very high 
probability) an element of L. The verifier is limited to tractable (Le. probabilistic polynomial-time) 
computations. We do not limit the computational power of the prover, in the cryptographic context, the 
prover may possess some secret information --- for example, the factorization of a certain integer N. 
(This is analogous to the following model of a "proof system" for a language L in NP: given an instance 
XE L, an NP prover computes a string y and sends it to a detem1inistic polynomial-time verifier, which I 
uses y to check that indeed XE L.) 
Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff called an interactive proof-system for L zero-knowledge if it releases 
no additional knowledge --- that is, nothing more than the one bit of knowledge given by the assertion 
that XE L [16]. Extending their definition, we consider all two-party protocols for the purpose of 
transferring from one party to the other the result of a specified computation --- y=f(x), say --- depending 
on the input x, and call any such protocol minimum-knowledge if it releases nothing more than the 
assertion that y=f(x). Naturally, such interactive protocols are of particular interest in a cryptographic 
setting where distrustful users with unequal computing power communicate witl1 each other. 
After giving our definition of minimum-knowledge protocols, we prove that the concatenation of two 
minimum-knowledge protocols is minimum-knowlcdge. This suggests the importance of the minimum-
knowledge property for the modular design of complex protocols. In fact, it is by serially composing 
several minimum-knowledge sub-protocols that we formulate the more complex minimum-knowledge 
protocol that we introduce in this paper. 
In tl1is paper we extend the ability of interactive proof-system protocols from confirming that a given 
string x is in a language L to deciding whether XE L or Xi: L. That is, we give tl1e first (non-trivial) 
example of a language L so that both L and its complement have minimum-knowledge interactive proof-
systems for confirming membership, where botl1 the proof of membership in L and the proof of non-
membership in L are by means of the same protocol, which releases no more knowledge than the value of 
the membership bit (XE L). 
Furthermore, by following the protocol, the prover demonstrates to the verifier either that XE L or that 
Xi: L, in such a way that tl1e two cases arc indistinguishable to an eavesdropping tl1ird party that is limited 
to feasible computations. In fact, the protocol releases no knowledge at all to such an eavesdropper. As 
usual, we assume that tl1e eavesdropper knows both the prover's and the verifier'S algorithms, and we 
allow him access to all messages passed during an execution of the protocol. In spite of the fact iliat our 
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protocol makes no use of encryption functions, the eavcsdropper receives no knowledge about whether he 
has just witnessed an interactive proof of the assertion that XE L or of the assertion that X\i!: L. We call 
this property of our protocol result-indistinguishability. 
The proof that our protocol is minimum-knowledge with respect to the verifier and rcsult-
indistinguishable with respect to the eavesdropper relies on no unproved assumptions about the 
complexity of a number-theoretic problem. 
The work of[16, 1, 22] concentrates on the knowledge transmitted by a prover to an active verifier. 
Introducing a third pany to the scenario, we analyze the knowledge gained both by an active verifier and 
by a passive eavesdropper. 
If membership or non-membership in L is an intractable computation, then a result-indistinguishable 
minimum-knowledge protocol for L can be used as a tool in building a cryptographic system. After an 
execution of our protocol, the string x can serve as a cryptographically secure encoding --- shared only by 
the prover and the verifier --- of the membership-bit (XE L). The use of x as an encoding of the 
membership-bit exemplifies what we may call minimum-knowledge cryptography: it is a probabilistic 
encryption with the property that neither its specification (i.e. the interactive proof of the value encoded 
by x) nor its further use in communication can release any compromising knowledge, either to the verifier 
or to an eavesdropper. The minimum-knowledge property ensures that each party receives exactly the 
knowledge he is supposed to receive and nothing more. A cryptosystem whose protocols are minimum-
knowledge has the strongest security against passive attack that we could hope to prove: in particular, it is 
secure against both chosen-message and chosen-ciphertext attack. 
The predicate that our protocol tests is that of being a quadratic residue or nonresidue modulo N for a 
certain number N (whose factorization may be the prover's secret infom1ation). We note that the 
language for which we show membership and non-membership is in NP fl co-NP. A conventional 
membership proof for these languages releases the factorization of N. while in the interactive proof-
system presented below no extra knowledge (about the factorization or about anything else) is given 
either to the verifier or to an eavesdropper. 
An important motivation in our work on this protocol comes from our desire to guarantee the security 
of cryptographic keys, especially in situations where the generation of new keys is very costly or is 
otherwise limited by the context. If the integer N is the prover's public key in a public-key cryptosystem, 
then N is not compromised by polynomially many executions of our protocol; a polynomially bounded 
opponent knows no more after witnessing or paIticipating in these executions than he knew before the key 
was used at all. 
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2. Preliminaries 
2.1. Interactive Turing Machines 
We specify the model for which we describe our protocol; this is an extension of the model used in 
[16]. Two probabilistic Turing machines A and B form an interactive pair oj Turing machines if they 
share a read-omy input tape and a pair of communication tapes; one of the communication tapes is 
exclusive-write for A, while the other is exclusive-write for B. (The writing heads are unidirectional; once 
a symbol has been written on a communication tape, it cannot be erased.) We model each machine's 
probabilistic nature by providing it with a read-only random tape with a unidirectional read-head; the 
machine" flips a coin" by reading the next bit from its random tape. The two machines take turns being 
active. While it is active, a machine can read the communication tapes, perform computation using its 
own work tape and consulting its random tape, and send a message to the other machine by writing the 
message on its exclusive-write communication tape. In addition, B has a private output tape; whatever is 
written on this tape when A and B halt is the result of their computation. 
In order to model the fact that the system is not memory-less, we also assume that each machine has a 
history tape, with a unidirectional write-head, on which the following records are automatically written: 
• When the machine flips a coin, the bit it reads from its random tape is recorded on its history 
tape. 
• At the beginning of each active tum, when the machine reads a new message from the other 
machine's exclusive-write communication tape, it records this message on its history tape . 
• At the end of each active tum, when the machine writes a message to the other machine on its 
own exclusive-write communication tape, it records this message on its history tape . 
• The result written on B 's output tape is also recorded on B 's history tape. 
These records are written on the history tape sequentially in order according to the machine's 
computation; for example, when the machine flips a coin several times while computing its next message, 
these random bits are recorded on the history tape immediately before the message. The input tape and 
communication tapes are public, or shared by the two machines; each machine's random tape, history 
tape, and work tape are private, as is B's output tape. This is not the only way to model the situation we 
would like to describe, and some of the records written on the history tape are redundant, but without loss 
of generality we may assume this mode of operation. 
When A and B begin their computation, an infinite bit-string is written on each of their random tapes. 
The choice of these two bit-strings, independently and uniformly at random from the set of all infinite 
strings, defines a probability measure on the set of possible computation histories of (A, B) that begin in 
any particular configuration. 
For any strings x, h we say that the interactive pair of Turing machines (A, B) begins its computation 
with input x and B's initial history h if in their initial configuration x is written on the common input tape 
and h is the written portion of B's history tape. (Throughout this paper, we are not concerned with the 
contents of A's history tape.) We use (A, B)[x.hll0 denote the set of computations that begin in this 
configuration. In each of the protocols that we present in this paper. B never consults its history tape. 
However, in discussing the properties of these protocols, we must be concerned with an arbitrary Turing 
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machine that may take the role of B in an interaction with A, and that may make use of its history tape. 
In what follows, B is limited to expected running time that is polynomial in the length of the common 
input x, while we make no limiting assumption about A's computational resources. (For cryptographic 
applications, A is also limited to feasible computation, but possesses some trapdoor information). Their 
messages to each other arc in cleartext, though these messages may depend on their private coin flips, 
which remain hidden. We assume that both the length of B 's initial history, as well as the total length of 
the messages written on the two communication tapes, arc polynomial in Ixl. For any input string x, we 
introduce the notation Hx = ( II I II E (0,1)·, I II 1= 0 (Ix 1° (I») for the set of associated initial histories that 
we allow. 
Our scenario also includes a third probabilistic Turing machine C, limited to expected polynomial-time 
computation, that can read the input and communication tapes of A and B and knows their algorithms. A 
is the prover, B is the verifier, and C is the eavesdropper. 
2.2. Ensembles of Strings 
In order to speak precisely of the knowledge transmitted by communicated messages, we need the 
following definitions [16,24, 6]. Let I!;; (0, I)· be an infinite set of strings, and let c be a positive 
constant; for each XE I, let 1t[x] be a probability distribution on a set of bit-strings. We call 
IT = (1t[x] I XE I) an ensemble of strings (usually suppressing any mention of I and c). 
For example, if M is a probabilistic Turing machine, then any input string x defines a probability 
distribution, according to the coin-tosses (Le. the random tape) of M's computation, on the set M[x] of 
possible outputs ofM on inputx. Thus, for any I, (M[x] I XE I) is an ensemble. 
As a second example, suppose that (A, B) is an interactive pair of Turing machines. For any strings 
x, II, let VIEWB(A,B)[x,lI]} denote the set of private "histories" that may be written on B's history tape 
during a computation that begins with input x and B 's initial history 11; each of these is B 's private view of 
the protocol execution. This set has a natural probability distribution according to the random tapes of A 
and B. Thus, for any set I, ( VIEW B (A,B)[x, II]) I XE I, II E Hx} is an ensemble of strings. 
As another example, for any string x let COM {CA, B)[xJ} denote the set of possible ordered sequences 
of messages written on the communication tapes of A and B during a computation that begins with input 
x. Each of these is the public view, and in particular that of the eavesdropper C, of a protocol execution 
of A and B. This set also has a natural probability distribution. (We assume that the specified 
computations do not make use of previous private or public history). Thus, for any set I, 
(COM(A,B)[x]) IXE I} is an ensemble of strings that we call the communications ensemble produced 
by the interactive system (A, B). 
A distinguisl1er is a family D = {D x I x E I} of circuits with a single Boolean output; we assume that 
there is a constant c so that circuit D x has Ix Ie input gates and one output gate. D is polynomial-size if 
there is a constant d so that D x has at most I x Id nodes. Suppose that IT = {1t[xll x E I} and 
IT' = {1t'[x] I XE I} are ensembles of strings, and that D is a distinguisher (all with respect to the same 
constant c). Let PD(1t[x]) be the probability that D x outpuL" a I when it is given as input a single sample 
5 
string of length Ix IC, randomly selected according to probability distribution n[x]: and let po(7t'[xD, 
depending on the distribution n'[x], be defined similarly. We call the two ensembles (computationally) 
indistinguishable if for any polynomial-size distinguisher D, for all n and sufficiently long x, 
Ipo(7t[x])-po(n'[xDI < Ixl-n. 
This condition holds, of course, if the two ensembles arc exactly identical. In this case, e(x) is exactly 
zero, and therefore, for any distinguisher D the difference IPo(7t[x])-PD(7t'[x]) I is also equal to zero. 
Let 7t and 7t' be two probability distributions on strings, and suppose that the number 8 satisfies 
0~8~ 1. We say that n approximates n' with error probability 8 if 
L I prob(7t[x] =.'1) - prob(n'[xJ =.'1) I ~ 8 
s 
(where the sum is taken over all strings .'I in {O, I} *). This implies that the difference 
IPD(n[x])-PD(n'[x]) I ~ 8 for any distinguisher D, even if the definition of "distinguisher" is relaxed to 
allow as inputs to Dx a set of many samples randomly chosen either according to n[x] or according to 
n'[x]. 
2.3. Interactive Proof-Systems and Transfer Protocols 
This paper is mainly devoted to a special sort of two-party protocol, that of interactively proving or 
disproving membership in a language L. A protocol tl1at achieves this is called an interactive 
proof-system for L [16]. The prover A and the verifier B share a common input x, the string whose 
membership is in question. We assume that x belongs to a fixed set /, /~L, of input strings for (A, B). 
Depending on k=lxl. the length of the (binary) representation of the input string, we allow an error 
probability 8(k) that vanishes with increasing k. (In fact, all of the examples in this paper satisfy ilie 
stronger requirement of an error probability that is exponentially vanishing in k.) 
Extending the definition of [16], we distinguish between a confirming proof-system for L, whose 
pUIpose is iliat ilie verifier confirm membership in L for the input string, and a deciding proof-system for 
L, whose purpose is iliat the verifier decide whether or not the input string is in L. At the end of a 
confirming protocol, ilie verifier may either accept the proof that XE L, or reject the proof: at ilie end of a 
deciding protocol, the verifier may either accept a proof that XE L, or accept a proof that xe: L, or reject 
tl1e proof. The execution ends normally when all of B 's messages appear as if it is following the protocol: 
if this is so, then A ends the execution in a success state. A may halt the execution of the protocol if it 
detects iliat B is not following the protocol, ending the execution in afai/ure state. 
For any input string x, let k= Ixl. We say that (A, B) is a confirming interactive proof-system for L witl1 
inputs / and error probability 8(k) if: 
1. For any XE L given as input 10 (A, B), B accepts the proof with probability at least I-8(k). 
2. For any interactive Turing machine A *, and for any x E /-L given as input to (A', B), B 
accepts the proof with probability at most 8(k). 
We say tl1at (A, B) is a deciding interactive proof-system for L with inputs / and error probability 8(k) if: 
1. For any XE / given as input to (A, B), B accepts the proof, haIling with the correct value of 
the predicate (XE L) on its output tape, with probability at least 1-8(k). 
2. For any interactive Turing machine A·, and for any XE / given as input to (A·, B), B accepts 
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a proof of the incorrect value of the predicate (XE L) with probability at most 8(k). 
As part of the definition, we require that these conditions should hold independently of the choice of the 
initial-history string (of length polynomial in k) that may be written on B's history tape at the beginning 
of the computation. 
In the first definition, we require that (Wit11 high probability) B correctly accept the proof for strings 
XE L, and t11at no cheating adversary, no matter how powerful, can convince B incorrectly to accept the 
proof for strings X~ L (except with vanishingly small probability). In the second definition, we require 
that (with high probability), given any input string XE I, B correctly decide whet1ler XE L or X~ L. and 
that no adversary can convince B to accept an incorrect proof (except with vanishingly small probability). 
The probability is taken over all sequences of coin-tosses (i.e. over all possible random-tape bit-strings) 
used by ilie probabilistic computations of the two Turing machines. 
The two definitions above describe correctness for protocols that transfer to B the computed value of a 
Boolean predicate tl1at supplies one bit of "knowledge" about the input string. We can also study a more 
general sort of transfer protocol whose purpose is to transfer the result F(x) of any specified computation 
depending on tl1e input string x. For example, a deciding interactive proof-system for the language L is a 
transfer protocol for tile function F(x) taking thc value 1 or 0 according to wheti1cr or not XE L. Bccause 
tl1e interacting machines are probabilistic, the intended result may take values in a probability distribution 
whose value F(x, r) depends on x as well as on a random input string r. As in the case of an interactive 
proof-system, B may either accept or reject an execution of an interaction with another Turing machine. 
We say that a given protocol (A, B) is correct for a specified probability distribution of outputs if B's 
computed result, when it interacts with A, has tl1e intended distribution (witl1 very high probability), and 
no machine A·, no matter how powerful, can bias the distribution of B 's outputs (except with vanishingly 
small probability). 
In order to defme "correcmess" more precisely, we observe tl1at the computations of any interactive 
pair of Turing machines (A, B) detennine a partial function/A H' as follows. Given strings x, r A' and rB, 
we define fA,H(x, r A' rB) to be the result written on B' s output t~pe at the end of an accepting computation 
of (A, B) that begins wiili input x, when tl1cir random-tape strings begin with r A and rn (respectively): tl1is 
value is well-defmed, as long as rA and rB are sufficiently long. Notice tl1at the choice of rA and rB 
defmes a probability distribution/A,n(x", .). 
We say iliat (A, B) is a correct transfer protocol for the probability distribution F(x, r), wiili inputs I 
and error probability 8(-), if: 
1. For each XE I, the distribution/A,B(x",,) of B's computed outputs approximates. with error 
probability 8(lxl), tl1e distribution F(x,·) of intended results. 
2. Let A· be any interactive Turing machine. We require that for any XE I and for any 
SE {OJ}", the probability that B accepts the computation of (A·, B) on input x and writes 
out ilie string s as its output is bounded by tl1e quantity prob(F(x, .) = s) + 8(1 x I). 
Note iliat, according to ilie second part of this definition, it may be possible for a malicious adversary A" 
to bias the distribution of the set of conversations of (Le. the set of sequences of messages exchanged by) 
A" and B on a particular input string x. But A· cannot significantly increase tl1e probability iliat any given 
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result string is accepted by B; in particular, A· cannot force B to accept an erroneous result (one which 
occurs with probability zero in the distribution F(x, .» except with probability 8(1 x D. 
Observe that the probability threshold 8 occurs twice in the above definition. In general, there may be 
protocols for which it makes sense to define correctness with two different 8's. In all our examples, the 
function 8(k) is exponentially vanishing in k; therefore, for simpliCity, we use the same 8 in both places. 
3. Knowledge 
In the setting of complexity theory, what do we mean by "knowledge"? Informally, a message 
conveys knowledge if it communicates the result of an intractable computation. A message that consists 
of the result of a computation that we can easily carry out by ourselves does not convey knowledge. In 
particular, a string of random bits --- or a string of bits that is "indistinguishable" from a random string 
(as defined above) --- does not convey knowledge, since we can flip coins by ourselves. 
3.1. Minimum Knowledge 
Suppose that (A. B) is a confirming interactive proof-system for a language L, taking inpuL<; from the 
set!. Following the definition in [16], we say that the system (A, B) is minimum-knowledge if, given any 
expected polynomial-time probabilistic Turing machine B·, there exists another probabilistic Turing 
machine MB •. running in expected polynomial time, such that the ensembles {MB*[x, h] I XE L, hE Hx} 
and { VIEW B* {(A,BO)[x, h]} I x E L, hE Hx} are (computationally) indistinguishable. If the ensembles are 
identical, we say that the proof-system is perfectly minimum-knowledge. 
The output of MBo, on input XE L and initial history h, is a simulation of BO,s view of the computation 
that A and B· would have on the same input and the sanle initial history. Note that, in this definition, we 
are not concerned with inputs that do not belong to L. When it takes part in a successful execution of the 
protocol with input x, BOO learns that (with high probability) the predicate of language-membership 
associated with the protocol, XE L, is true; however, it gains no more knowledge than this. Note that in 
our examples, B (the machine that acts according to the protocol specifications) does not use its initial 
history string at all; however, when we worry about the' 'knowledge" that a cheating machine BOO may try 
to extract from A we have to consider the fact that B* can use its history string. 
The authors of [16] called a confirming proof-system satisfying the above properties "zero-
knowledge." We now show how to extend this definition so as to be able to say when a more general 
sort of protocol --- for example, a two-party protocol whose purpose is to transfer to one of the parties the 
result of a hard computation --- should be called' 'minimum-knowledge." 
Let (A, B) be an interactive pair of Turing machines which constitute a correct transfer protocol for the 
probability distribution F(x, r), with inputs I and error probability 8. We say that (A, B) is 
minimwn-knowledge if, given any expected polynomial-time probabilistic Turing machine B·, there exists 
another probabilistic Turing machine Mso, running in expected polynomial time, such that: 
1. MB" has one-time access to an F-oracle, as follows. Given any input x and initial history h, 
MB• queries the oracle with input x; the oracle returns a value distributed according to 
F(x,·). 
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2. The ensembles {MB,,[x,h]lxEI,hEH
x
} and {VIEWB,,{(A,B*)[x,h]} IXEI, hEH} are 
indistinguishable. x 
If the ensembles are identical, we say that the proof-system is perfectly minimum-knowledge. Note that, 
in this definition, the simulation MB*[x,h] is defined for any XE I and any initial history h of length 
polynomial in Ix/. 
In order to motivate this definition, we recall that we are trying to formalize the notion o~ the amount of 
knowledge transmitted by a sequence of messages. Speaking informally, one gains no knowledge from a 
message which is the result of a feasible computation that one could just as well have carried out by 
oneself. If the purpose of a protocol followed by two interacting panies A and B is that A transmit to B a 
value v chosen according to the probability distribution F(x, r), we would like to be able to say exactly 
when the protocol transmits no more knowledge than this value. We might also demand that the protocol 
accomplish this even if B somehow tries to cheat --- that is, even if the Turing machine B is replaced by 
another (polynomial-time, but possibly "cheating") machine BOO. The simple transmission of the value v 
can be modelled by a single oracle query (with input x). If the provision of this oracle query makes it 
possible, by means of a feasible computation, to simulate BO's view of the "conversation" that A and BOO 
would have had on input x, then we can say that when A and B* actually have a conversation (i.e. follow 
the protocol) with the same input, there is no additional knowledge transmitted to B* besides the value v. 
Note that if F is computable in expected polynomial time, then the F-oracle adds no power to the 
machine MB •• In this case MR. can compute F without the assistance of A. 
Remark: In the above definition, we allow as an initial history string h any string of length polynomial 
in the length of the input string x. In recent work, Goldreich, Micali, and Wigderson introduced the 
notion of an interactive proof-system which is zero-knowledge under celtain complexity-theoretic 
"cryptographic assumptions" [13]. To prove the desired properties of zero-knowledge protocols in a 
cryptographic setting (where a fixed encryption scheme is used), one must restrict the (ensemble of) 
permitted history strings to be an ensemble that is indistinguishable from the output ensemble of a 
(polynomially bounded) "adversary" of the encryption scheme (as in the definition of cryptographic 
security of Goldwasser and Micali [15]). 
In all our examples, the simulating machine MB* uses the program of BOO as a subprogram or 
subroutine. This subprogram makes use of the simulator's input tape (containing the input string x). a 
virtual history tape (which is initialized to contain the given initial history h), a virtual random tape. a 
virtual work tape, two virtual communication tapes, and a virtual output tape. Without loss of generality 
we supply the probabilistic machine MB" with two random tapes; one of these is B"'s virtual random tape. 
On its output tape --- which is also the virtual history tape for the subprogram B* --- the simulator uses the 
subprogram to write records that correspond to B··s view of the simulated protocol execution. 
While carrying on its computation, the machine MB" may back up a few steps in the simulated protocol 
and restore a previous machine configuration: It recovers the old state of B* and the old content of the 
virtual work tape. and resets both the viltual read-head of B*'s random tape and the write-head of its own 
l 
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output tape (the virtual history tape) to where they had been earlier; then it proceeds with its simulation, 
starting again from the old configuration but" flipping new coins" in its probabilistic computation. 
The virtual communication tapes are used to simulate the communication activities of the simulated 
protocol. The simulator "sends" a message to B* by writing it on the appropriate virtual !mmunication 
tape and then activating the subprogram. The subprogram operates for (the simulation 01) e active tum, 
and then writes a message on the other virtual communication tape; this is the next messa e .. received" 
from BO. Just as in the interaction of B* with A, the simulator's subprogram B* records random bits, 
messages read and written, and the computed result on the virtual history tape. The operation of the 
subprogram B* during a simulated active tum, beginning in a certain state with a certain configuration of 
the virtual tapes, is identical to the operation of the interactive Turing machine B* during an active tum, 
beginning in the same state with the same configuration of the actual tapes, of an actual protocol 
execution with A. This matter of the difference in B* 's operation, either as a subprogram of the simulator 
or as a Turing machine interacting with A, is discussed further in Remark 2 at the end of the next section. 
3.2. Concatenation of Protocols I 
Next, we investigate how protocols may be concatenated in order to achieve mOdula~ in protocol 
design, and how properties of the resulting protocol can be derived from the properties of its sub-
protocols. The protocol presented in this paper is an example of such a modular design. 
We write s·s' for the concatenation of the two strings sand s'. 
Suppose that we are given two protocols PI = (AI' BI) and P2 = (A2, B2). We define the concatenation 
of the two protocols, denoted P = PI;P 2' to be the following two-stage protocol: Its first stage is PI' If at 
the end of this stage Al is not in a failure state and B I has not rejected, the protocol cominues with P 2: 
otherwise the protocol halts. We write Al ;A2 and B I ;B2 for the interacting machines of the concatenated 
protocol. At the end of an execution, the history tape of BI :B2 contains the initial history-string, followed 
by B I 's private view of the execution of PI' followed by B2's private view of the execution of P 2' 
Assume that PI and P2 are two transfer protocols for the probability distributions Fl and F2, 
respectively. both taking inputs from the set!. Then the concatenated protocol, on input XE I. transfers to 
B1:B2 the combined result [FI(x, .),F2(x,.)]. As a special case, suppose that PI is a confimling interactive 
proof-system for LI with inputs /, and that P 2 is a coniimling interactive proof-system for ~ with inputs 
L I • Then the concatenated protocol is a confirming interactive proof-system for L 1rV...,2' with inputs I. 
It may not be surprising that the concatenation of two correct protocols gives the correct combined 
result. The more important observation is that, as we prove below. the concatenated protocol is 
minimum-knowledge if PI and P2 are both minimum-knowledge. 
I 
Lemma: Given two protocols PI and P2 as above. with error probabilities 0l(k) and 82(k) , 
respectively. Then the concatenation P = PI;P 2 is a protocol that transfers the combined result 
[F1(x.·),F2(x.·)] with error probability o(k) = 0l(k)+ 0Z<k)-ol(k),0Z<k). Furthermore. if PI and P2 are 
both minimum-knowledge (or. respectively, both perfectly minimum-knowledge). then so is their 
concatenation. 
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Proof: First we show that correctness of protocols is preserved by concatenation. It is clear that if 
(AI' BI) is correct with probability at least 1-°1, and (A2, B2) is correct with probability at least 1-°2, 
then (A, B) is correct with probability at least 1-(°1 +°2-°1'°2), Similarly, it follows from the fact that \ 
no interactive Turing machine A; can force B I to accept an incorrect result for P I except with probability 
°1, and that no A; can force B2 to accept an incorrect resul t for P 2 except wi th probability °2, that no A * 
can force B to accept an incorrect result in the concatenated protocol except w' probability 
°1 +°2-°(°2, 
Next we show that concatenation maintains the minimum-knowledge property. Assume that PI and P 2 
are both minimum-knowledge, and let B* be any probabilistic interactive Turing mac . e, running in 
expected polynomial time, that interacts with AI:A2• We may write B* = B;:B; to denote e two parts of 
For convenience, let us write VI[x,h] = VIEWB*{(A1, I and 
V2[x,hJ = VIEWB*{(A2,B;)[x,h]}. Thus, for any input string x and any initial histo h, we have 2 
VIEWB*{(A,B*)[x,h]} = {v(v21 VI E VI[x,h], V2E V2[x,h·v l ]}· 
To show that the concatenated protocol P is minimum-knowledge we have to show the existence of a 
simulating expected polynomial time probabilistic Turing machine M = MB* whose output ensemble 
{M[x.h] I XE I, hE Hx} is indistinguishable from the ensemble { VIEWB* {(A,B*)[x, h]} I XE I, hE Hx }' 
Our hypothesis on PI implies that, given B;, there is a simulating machine M I' running in expected 
polynomial time, with access to an FI-oracle, so that the ensembles {M1[x,hll XE I, hE Hx} and 
{VI[x,h] I XE I, hE Hx} are indistinguishable. Similarly. our hypothesis on P2 implies that, given B;, 
there is a simulating machine M2, running in expected polynomial time, with access to an F2-oracle, so 
that the ensembles {M2[x,h]lxEI,hEHx } and {V2[x,h]lxEI,hEHx } are indistinguishable. We 
specify M to be the machine that operates as follows, given any input string XE I and initial history 
hE Hx' First, M runs machine Ml on (X, h) to produce an output hi' Second, if hi is the simulation of a 
successful execution of PI' then M runs ~ on (X, hi) to produce its final output: otherwise, M simply 
writes out hi' 
For any XE I, hE Hx we define the sets of strings 
EI[x,h] = VIEWB*{(A,B*)[x,h]} = {v(v21 VI E V1[x,h], V2E V2[x,h.v l ]}, and 
E2[x, h] = M[x, h] = {m1·m21 m l E MI [x, h], m2 E M 2[x, h·m!] }. 
(As usual, the choices of the bit-strings that are written on these probabilistic machines'j random tapes 
define a probability distribution on both of these sets.) We need to show that the ensembles 
£1= {E1[x,h] I XE I, hE Hx} and E2= {E2[x,h] I XE I, hE Hx} are indistinguishable. For this purpose, we 
introduce the intennediate ensemble E3= {E3[x. h] I x E I. hE H x}, where 
E3[x,h] = {v(m21 VI E VI[x.h], m2 E M 2 [x,h·v 1]}· 
Assume that £1 and E2 are not computationally indistinguishable. Then there is a polynomial-size 
distinguisher D = {D I I XE l,hE H } that distinguishes between the two ensembles. In other words, in 
x. J x 
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the notation of Section 2.2, for some n and for infinitely many pairs (x, h) (with x E I. hE H). 
IPD(EI [x,hD-PD(E2[x,hDI> Ixl-n. 
This implies, by the triangle inequality, that at least one of the inequalities 
IPD(E2[x,h])-PD(E3[x,hDI > ~ Ixl-n 
IPD(EI [x.h])-PD(E3[x,hDI > ~ Ixl-n 
(1) 
(2) 
holds infinitely often, i.e. that the circuit-family D distinguishes either between £2 and E3 or between EI 
and E3 (or both). We next show that either of these possibilities leads to a contradiction. 
First, we show that if D distinb'Uishes between E2and E3 tJlen we can construct a distinguisher DI that 
distinguishes between the ensembles {MI[x,h] I XE I, hE Hx} and { VI [x, h) I XE I, hE Hx}. contradicting 
the hypothesis that PI is minimum-knowledge. Lct II bc the infinite set of pairs (x,h) for which 
inequality (1) holds. Given as input a string s, chosen eithcr from MI[x,hl or from VI[x,h),let Cx,h be the 
(probabilistic) circuit that does the following: It simulates tJle operation of M2 on input (x, s) for a suitable 
multiple of its expected running time to produce either a string tn2 or (for those few scquenccs of coin-
flips which may cause M2 to run too long) a null output, then passes /z·m2 to the circuit D x,h' which gives 
its output. Since the simulation of M2 is polynomial in length, and D is polynomial-size, the circuit-
family C is also polynomial-size. Inequality (I) shows that for all pairs (x, h) E II' the circuit CX•h 
distinguishes between MI [x. h) and VI [x, h]. Therefore. C
x
•h can be converted into a deterministic 
polynomial-size circuit (DI)x.h that distinguishes between the same two sets. 
Second, we show that if D distinguishes between EI and £3 then we can construct a distinguisher D2 
that distinguishes between the ensembles {M2[x.hJlxE/,/zEHx } and {V2[x,hllxE/,hEHx }, 
contradicting the hypothesis that P 2 is minimum-knowledge. Let 12 be the infinite set of pairs (x, h) for 
which inequality (2) holds, and consider the infinite set 12' = { (x, v) I v E VI [x, hL (x, h) E 12}. We define 
(D2)x,h to be the circuit whose output. on input s (choscn cithcr from M2 [x,h) or from V2[x,h)) is tJle 
output of D
x
•h on input h·s. Since D is polynomial-size, it is clear that D2 is polynomial-size, too. 
IneqUality (2) shows that (D2)x.h distinguishes bctween M2fx, h) and V2 [x, Iz 1 for infinitely many pairs 
(x, h) --- namely, for all pairs (x, V)E 12'. 
We merefore conclude that the concatenated protocol is minimum-knowlcdge. Analogous arguments 
show mat the concatenated protocol is perfectly minimum-knowledge if the same is true of both 
component protocols. 
QED 
Remark 1: This lemma also holds for minimum-knowledge protocols in the cryptographic setting, 
where the permitted history strings are restricted as described in the remark of Section 3.1 above. 
Remark 2: We mention here a special case of the above lemma that we use implicitly throughout the 
proofs in Sections 5 and 6. Suppose that a protocol (A, B) is given, and consider a certain point in the 
protocol execution when A has just sent a message and B is about to perform its next active tum. Let PI 
be me protocol up to this point, and let P 2 consist just of B's next active tum. The lemma implies that if 
I 
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PI and P 2 are minimum-knowledge, then so is the given protocol through the end of B's next tum. This 
allows us to specify a machine MB" for our proofs below, simply by having the machine activate a 
subprogram B· as explained at the end of the previous section: As long as the subprogram, when 
activated, has access to a virtual history tape whose contents are indistinguishable from the history tape of 
an actual protocol execution carried on with A, its operation within MB" is identical to its operation 
during an actual interaction. 
3.3. Result Indistinguishability 
Next we introduce the eavesdropper C, as described above. Recall that COM {(A, B)[x]) is the set of 
possibilities for C's view of the computation of A and B on input x. In all our examples of interactive 
pairs of Turing machines (A, B), neither machine uses its history tape. Thus, without loss of generality 
we can assume that A and B begin their computation with their history tapes initially empty. 
We call an interactive pair of Turing machines (A, B) result-indistinguishable if an eavesdropper that 
has access to the communications of A and B on inputx gains no knowledge. More precisely, the system 
(A, B) is result-indistinguishable if there exists a probabilistic pOlynomial-time Turing machine M such 
that the ensembles {M[x] I XE I} and {COM{ (A, B)[x]) I XE I} are indistinguishable. If the ensembles 
are exactly identical, we say that the proof-system is perfectly result-indistinguishable. 
Suppose that (A, B) is a transfer protocol for the probability distribution F(x, r). Observe that unlike 
the simulating machine in the definition of the minimum-knowledge property, this machine M does not 
have access to an oracle for F. In other words, M can simulate the communications of A and B on input 
x, regardless of the value F(x, r) (even if computing F is intractable), Since this simulation is by means of 
a feasible computation that an eavesdropping adversary could carry out for itself, the adversary gains no 
knowledge if it is given the text of a "conversation" belonging to the set COM {(A,B)[x]). 
We remark that if two protocols are result-indistinguishable, then so is their concatenation. The 
simulating machine for the concatenated protocol is simply the concatenation of the two simulators for 
the component protocols; neither the interacting parties nor the simulator makes any computation that 
depends on the history tapes. 
4. Specification of the Language 
4.1. Preliminaries 
We assume that the reader is familiar with the following notions from elementary number theory. (See, 
for example, [17,21] for the number theory, and [19] for a computational point of view.) We will be 
working in the multiplicative group ZN" of integers relalively prime to N. Any clement ZE ZN* is called a 
quadratic residue if it is a square mod N (i.e. if the equation Xl = Z mod N has a solution): otherwise, z is a 
quadratic nonresidue mod N. Given N and ZE ZN"' the quantity called the Jacobi symbol of Z with 
respect to N, denoted (N), can be efficiently computed (in lime polynomial in 10gN) and takes on the 
values + 1 and -1. If (N) = -1, then Z must be a quadratic nonresidue mod N. On tl1e other hand. if 
(N) = + 1, then Z may be either a residue or a nonresidue. Determining which is the case, without knowing 
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the factorization of N, appears to be an intractable problem, namely the quadratic residuosity problem. 
(However, given the prime factorization of N, it is easy to determine whether or not z is a quadratic 
residue.) Several cryptographic schemes have been proposed that base their security on the assumed 
difficulty of distinguishing between residues and nonresidues modulo an integer N that is hard to factor 
[15,3,20]. 
We also make use of Bernstein's law oflarge numbers [23, 19]: Suppose that the event E occurs with 
probability p, and let Fk(E) denote the frequency with which E occurs in k independent trials. Then for 
any k~ 1 and any positive E~p(1-p), 
2 
Prob( lFiE)-pl~E } ~2 e-k£ . 
4.2. The Language 
The protocol introduced in [16] is a minimum-knowledge confimling interactive proof-system for the 
language 
( (N, z) I z E Z/, z a quadratic nonresidue mod N }. 
The protocol that we present below is a deciding interactive proof-system, which is both minimum-
knowledge and result-indistinguishable, for a language based on the same problem. 
We use the notation v(N) to represent the number of distinct prime factors of an integer N. 
Our protocol is concerned with integers of a special form, namely those with prime factorization 
N= n:=IP/i such that for some i,Piei=3mod4. Let BL (lor Blum, who pointed out their usefulness in 
cryptographic protocols) denote the set of such integers. There are two equivalent formulations of 
membership in BL: (1) N E BL if and only if for any quadratic residue mod N, half its square roOL,> (mod 
N) have Jacobi symbol + 1 and hal f its square roots have Jacobi sym bol -1. (2) N E BL if and only if 
there exists a quadratic residue mod N which has two square roots with different Jacobi symbols [2]. 
The special integers that we require form a subset of BL, namely 
N= (NINEBL,N=lmod4,v(N)=2}. 
It is not hard to see that this set may equivalently be defined as 
N = {piqi I p;eqprime, i,j~ 1, pi=qi=3 mod4 }. 
Finally, we define the languages 
1= ( (N, z) I N EN, z E ZN·' (~)=+ I} and L = ( (N, z) E II z a quadratic residue modN }. 
Taking I as the set of inputs, this paper gives a deciding interactive proof-system for L. Notice that 
/-L = {(N, z) E / I Z a quadratic nonresidue mod N }. 
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4.3. Outline of the Protocol 
Our protocol is the concatenation of two sub-protocols. The first part is a confinning interactive 
proof-system for I. If the first part is completed successfully (i.e. if A proves to B that the input string is 
in /), thcn A and B perform the second part of the protocol. The second part, taking inputs from the set I, 
is a deciding interactive proof-system for the language L: A proves to B either that the input string is in L 
or that it is not in L. Both parts arc minimum-knowledge, and the second part is result-indistinguishable 
as well. The eavesdropper learns that, with high probability, the input is in I. But he gains no more 
knowledge than this --- in particular, he gains no computational advantage in deciding whether the input 
is in L or in I-L, i.e. whether or not Z is a quadratic residue mod N. 
The confinnation that an input string (N, z) belongs to I in tum requires three stages, which are carried 
out in the following order; each stage confirms a property of N or of z. 
1. N= 1 mod4, yeN»~ 1, ZE ZN-' and (N)=+l. 
2. NE BL. 
3. v(N)5,2. 
While proving that our protocol has the properties that we desire, we make no limiting assumption 
about the computational power of Turing machine A. However, we remark that the protocol can be 
pcrfonned by a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine A which is given the factorization of the 
relevant integers N. (In the cryptographic applications that we discuss later, the party that perfonns A's 
role in our protocol chooses N along with its prime factorization.) 
We now give the details of our protocol: the confirming first part in Section 5, and the deciding second 
part in Section 6. 
5. Interactive Confirmation of the Input Language 
In each of the protocols that we describe, we usc the notation "A ~ B: 
transmission of a message from A to B. 
5.1. Blum's Coin-Flip Protocol 
., to indicate the 
Our confinnation protocol requires that A and B jointly generate a sequence of bits. The verifier B has 
to be sure that A cannot bias these bits. They do this by following a protocol due to Blum [2]. 
An integer N E BL. N= 1 mod4. is given. 
A and B generate a random bit b: 
1. B chooses UE Z/ at random, and computes v:= u2 modN: 
B ~ A: v 
2. A chooses cr:=+1 or-I at random, its guess for (J~); 
A ~ B: cr 
3.B ~ A: u 
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4. if vrFu2modN then A halts the protocol in the FAILURE state: 
otherwise if cr = (M then b := 1 else b := 0 
The message triple (v, cr, u) may be regarded as an encoding of the bit b = ~+~C~)cr. 
This protocol is correct: Since B picks u at random and A picks the sign cr at random, the bit b chosen 
by the protocol is random. Furthennore, the first altem:lle characterization of BL (Section 4.2) implies 
that no interactive Turing machine A·, no matter what its computational power, can bias the bit produced, 
since it cannot guess the Jacobi symbol of the square root of v chosen by B with probability greater than 
1/2. 
We remark that a cheating Turing machine B* could bias the bit solely by using its ability to produce 
two numbers u and U', both square roots (mod N) of v, with opposite Jacobi symbols: this capacity would 
enable B· to factor N simply by computing the greatest common divisor (ll-U',N). 
The protocol is perfectly minimum-knowledge. The reason is that A's only task is to transmit a guess, 
cr = + 1 or -1, for a sign, a task that may easily be carried out by a simulator interacting with B·. We 
formalize this argument below. 
5.2. The Confirmation Protocol 
This is a minimum-knowledge confinning interactive proof-system by which A proves to B that the 
input (N, z) is in the language I defined above. It consists of the concatenation of three sub-protocols, 
each of which takes, as legal input, a string that has been confinned (with high probability) by the 
preceding sub-protocol. Let k denote the length of the input string. 
First Stage: The easy properties of Nand z 
This stage involves no communications between A and B. Given (N. z) as input. B checks that 
N == 1 mod 4, that N is not a prime power, and that (k)=+ 1. Each of these is easily accomplished in time 
polynomial in log N [19]. If anyone of these conditions docs not hold, then B REJECTs the proof (and 
halts the entire protocol). 
Second Stage: N belongs to BL 
The following protocol is due to Blum [21. The error probability of this proof-system is 82(k)=2-k• 
This stage does not concern itself with z at all. The integer N must satisfy N== 1 mod4; this condition 
holds if the first stage has been completed successfully. 
1. Repeat k times: 
1.1 A chooses a quadratic residue rE ZN* at random: 
A ~ B: r 
1.2 B chooses cr:=+1 or-1 at random; 
B ~ A: cr 
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1.3 if cr E {-I, + I} then A halts the protocol in the FAILURE state: 
otherwise A computes s such that s2=::,modNand (N) = cr: 
A ~ B: s 
1.4 B checks to make sure that s satisfies the above conditions: if not, then B REJECfs 
the proof (and halts the entire protoco!). 
2. B ACCEPTs the proof. 
Third Stage: N has two prime factors 
This stage also does not concern itself with z. 
Let us usc ZN*(± 1) to denote the set of elements of ZN* with Jacobi symbol ± 1 (respectively). This 
protocol relies on the fact that if N has exactly i prime factors (Le. y(N) = O. then exactly 1/2i-1 of the 
elements of ZN*(+l) are quadratic residues. A and B jointly pick random elements of ZN*(+l). If A can 
show that about half of them are residues (e.g. by producing their square roots mod N), then B should be 
convinced that v(N)S2. Since N is not a prime power, y(N) must be equal to 2. 
In order to pick a list of random elements of ZN*(+ 1), A and B follow Blum's coin-flip protocol. which 
requires that N E BL and N =:: 1 mod 4. These conditions hold (with very high probability) if the second 
stage has been completed successfully. 
2 
This proof-system has error probability 03(k) = 2e-k(1I8) • 
1. A and B use Blum's coin-flip protocol to generate k random elements '1'" . ,'k E ZN*(+l): 
i:=O; 
do until i=k: 
a. generating it bit by bit using Blum's coin-nip protocol, A and B choose a number 
a,O<a<N 
b. if g.c.d.(a,N);{: 1 (which happens with vanishingly small probability) then HALT the 
protocol 
c. if(N)=+l then i:=i+l: 'j:=a 
2. for each i = 1, ... ,k such that 'j is a quadratic residue, A computes Sj such that 
,. =::.'1.2 mod N: 
I I 
A ~ B: (i,s) 
3. B checks that at least 3/8 of the 'j are quadratic residues: if so then B ACCEPTs the proof 
(and otherwise B REJECTs the proof and halts the entire protocol). 
Theorem 1: This protocol is a perfectly minimum-knowledge confirming interactive proof-system for 
the language I = { (N, z) IN=:: 1 mod 4, N E BL, y(N) = 2, (k)=+ 1 ). 
Proof: We treat each of the three sub-protocol stages separately. As a consequence of the lemma of 
Section 3.2, it then follows immediately that the concatenation of the three has the required properties. 
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First Stage 
The first stage is, trivially, a confirming proof system for the language 
II = {(N,z)1 N= 1 mod4, yeN»~ 1, ZE ZN*' (~)=+I ), 
since each of these conditions is validated by B in polynomial time without interacting with A at all. 
Second Stage 
Given an integer N=l mod4 (in particular, given input that has been confirmed in the first stage), the 
second stage is a perfectly minimum-knowledge confirming interactive proof-system for the language 
12 = { (N, z) IN E BL} with error probability 8ik) = 2-k• 
This stage requires 0 (k) communication rounds, during which 0 (~) bits are exchanged. 
The correctness of this stage depends on the alle1l1ate characterizations of membership in BL (Section 
4.2). If N E BL, then each quadratic residue r sent by A has at least one square root mod N with Jacobi 
symbol +1 and at least one square root mod N with Jacobi symbol-I: no maller which sign cr B chooses, 
A can respond with a square root of the appropriate sign. B accepts the proof with probability 1. On the 
other hand, if N e BL then no quadratic residue mod N has two square roots with Jacobi symbols of 
opposite sign. In this case, it is very likely that there is some i for which A will be unable to send an 
appropriate S., and B will halt the protocol. The only way for a cheating A+ to convince B that NE BL (by 
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sending the appropriate elements Sj) is by guessing the entire sign-sequence a l , ... ,crk: the probability 
that such a guess will be correct is at most Tk= 8ik). Thus, this protocol is indeed a confirming 
interactive proof-system for BL. 
To prove the perfect minimum-knowledge propelty, choose any interactive Turing machine B+; we 
have to specify the computation of a Turing machine MB+ whose output, on input N E BL and initial 
history h, is a simulation of B"'s view of the computation that A and B" would have performed on the 
same input. This view includes a message-history that consists of triples (r, a, s) satisfying the conditions 
implicitly defined by the specification of the protocol. As described above in Section 3.1, MB" uses the 
program of B* as a subroutine. After initializing B', Mo' operates as follows: 
I. repeat k times: 
1.1 save the current configuration of B· 
1.2 choose SE ZN* at random, compute r:=s2 modN, "send" r to the simulated B", and 
"receive" cr in return 
1.3 if cre {-1,+1} then append HALT to A's message-record in B+'s virtual history, 
write out the updated virtual history, and halt: 
otherwise if (k)*a then restore the saved configuration of B" and go back to step 
1.1; 
(else (N)=cr and the most recent exchange of messages recorded in B*'s virtual 
history is the triple (r, a, s» 
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2. write out B·'s virtual history 
For each of the k iterations, the expected number of times the loop has to be repeated is 2, since for any 
value of r the probability that (N) = cr is exactly 1/2; thus the expected running time of MH'" is polynomial 
ink. 
The simulated messages "sent" to B'" are drawn from the same probability distribution as the messages 
sent by A in an actual execution of the protocol, and the random communications triples (r,cr,s) produced 
by MB• satisfy the conditions s2=rmodN and (R)=cr. As explained in section 3.2, these messages are 
interleaved on the virtual history tape with the random-tape bits used by B"', exactly as they would be in 
an actual interaction with A. Therefore the sets MB",[N,h] and ViEWB*{(A,B"')[N,Iz]) are identical. This 
completes the proof for the second s~age. 
Third Stage 
Given an integer from the set 
{NI NEBL,N=lmod4,v(N»1} 
(in particular, given input that has been confirmed in the first and second stages), the third stage is a 
perfectly minimum-knowledge confirming interactive proof-system for the language 
2 
i 3={ (N,z) I v(N)=2} with error probability 83(k)=2e-k(I/8) • 
This stage requires 0 (~) communication rounds, during which 0 (k3) bits are exchanged. 
During the third stage, A and B together choose random elements of ZN"'(+l). Since they do this by 
means of Blum's coin-flip protocol, and no Turing machine A· can bias the bil'i produced by Blum's 
procedure, these elements arc indeed produced at random. In order to prove that this stage is a proof-
system, consider the experiment of choosing a random element of ZN"'(+I), where the experiment is a 
success if the chosen clement is a quadratic residue mod N; let FlN) denote the frequency of successes in 
k independent trials. Recall that B accepts N if the frequency Fk(N) '? 3/8. As mentioned above, the 
probability of success in one trial is exactly 1/2v(N}-I. (Since N is known to have at least two prime 
factors, this probability is at most 1/2.) If v(N) is exactly 2, then the probability that B does not accept N 
is, by Bernstein'S law of large numbers, 
2 
Prob{ FiN) < 3/8 } ~ Prob{ lFiN)-1/21'?1/8} ~ 2e-k(I/8) = 83(k). 
On the other hand, if N has more than two prime factors, the probability of success in one uial is at most 
1/4, and thus the probability that B incorrectly accepts N (when interacting with a cheating A"') is 
2 
Prob{ FiN)'?3/8 } ~ Prob{ IFk(N)-1/41 '?1/8 } ~ 2 e-k(l!8) = 8lk). 
To prove the minimum-knowledge property, given an interactive Turing machine B'" we have to 
specify the computation of a simulating Turing machine MB",. The ensemble tJ1at MH'" must simulate 
includes a sequence of Blum coin-flips, so we begin by showing tJlat Blum's coin-flip protocol is 
perfectly minimum-knowledge. To prove this, we must specify the computation of a probabilistic 
polynomial-time Turing machine Mcoin whose output, on input N (satisfying N E BL and N= 1 mod4) and 
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initial history h. is a simulation of the ensemble VIEW B* {(A.B *)[N. hl). which includes a message triple 
(v.cr.u) encoding a bit as described in Section 5.1 above. Modelling the result oracle for the protocol. 
Mcoin is given as additional input a (presumably random) bit b. 
Given any bit b. Mcoin (initializes B* and) proceeds as follows: 
a. execute the protocol with B*: 
1. let B· "send" v (simulating step I) 
2. save the cun'ent configuration of B* 
3. simulate A's action in step 2 by choosing a:= ± 1 at random and "sending" it to B* 
4. let B* "send" u (simulating step 3) 
b. if the bit encoded by (v. a. u) is b. then write out B··s virtual histOlY (which includes the 
triple (v. a. u» and halt; 
otherwise: 
1. restore the saved configuration of B* 
2. simulating step 2 again, "send" -a (instead of a) to B * 
3. let B* "send" u' 
4. write out B*'s virtual history (which includes the triple (v.-a. u'» 
Note that if B· does not follow the protocol it may happen that the numbers u and u' are not the same: 
if their Jacobi symbol is the same the outcome of the protocol is the same random bit b and this has no 
effect on the output distribution of Mcoin (since B*. when interacting with A. can decide to send either u 
or -u). On the other hand. if they have opposite Jacobi symbols mod N. then the outcome bit I-b has 
been detennincd by B* and not chosen at random. As noted above. this can only happen if B* can factor 
N. in which case it indeed has the ability to dictate the outcome of the protocol. regardless of whether it is 
interacting with A or acting as a subroutine for Meoin' 
Whether the virtual history of B* written out by Mcoin was generated in step a or step b of the 
simulation. the distribution of its possible values (and thus the probability distribution of the bit encoded 
by the message triple) is identical to that of VIEWB*{(A,B*)[N.h]}. Thus the coin-flip protocol is 
perfectly minimum-knowledge. 
Next we describe the simulation by ME. of the third stage of our protocol. The set 
VIEWB"{(A.B*)[N.h]} that ME" must simulate begins with a sequence of Blum coin-flips. which are used 
to generate random elements of ZN"' This simulation can be perfonned by foIl owing the program Mcoin 
as just described: the difficulty for .(vIB"" a polynomial-time machine tllat may not be able to factor N, is 
that those elements which are quadratic residues must be randomly generated along with their square 
roots. 
Given as input an integer N that has been confimled by the first two stages and tllat satisfies v(N)=2, 
and given an initial history h. MH• proceeds as follows: 
1. i:= 0: A:= the empty list 
2. do until i=k: 
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choose a random number a, 0 < a < N; 
if g.c.d.(a, N);t 1 (which happens with vanishingly small probability) then FLAG the 
number a, adjoin it to A, and go to step 3; 
else; 
choose a random bit b (to decide the Jacobi symbol of the next element generated); 
if b=O then adjoin to A a random element ofZN*(-I); 
else: 
a. i:= i+l 
b. choose siE Z/ at random 
c. choose a random bit b i (to decide whether the next element generated should be a 
quadratic residue); 
if b j=Othenrj :=sj2 modN (a random residue in ZN*(+l)) 
else ri:=-s? modN (a random non-residue in ZN*(+l)) 
d. adjoin r. to A , 
3. (simulate as many executions as needed of Blum's coin-flip in order to generate the 
sequence of bits in the list A) 
for each bit b in the representation of each number in A: 
follow the procedure above for Mcoin (using B* as a subroutine), recording the numbers u 
(and possibly u') "sent" by B*; 
if the outcome of the coin-flip simulation is indeed b, then continue with the next bit in A: 
otherwise B* has "forced" the complementary outcome I-b by "sending" u and u' with 
(N);t (*), in which case: 
a. use u and u' to factor N 
b. discard the rest of A 
c. repeatedly execute Blum's coin-flip with B"' (as originally specified, without 
backtracking to restore previous conligurations of B*) in order to choose elements of 
ZN"', bit by bit, until the resulting list contains k elements (r1, ••• ,ric' say) with 
Jacobi symbol + 1; again let A denote the new list 
4. if the last number in A is FLAGGED then halt 
5. discard the clements in A with Jacobi symbol-l 
6. if B* has not "forced" the outcome of any of the coin- flip simulations of step 3, then for 
each r. in A such that b.=O "send" (i, s.) to B*; 
, I I 
otherwise, use the factorization of N to test each r. in A to sec whether it is a quadratic 
I 
residue; ifit is, then compute s. such that r.:=s.2mod N and "send" (i,s.) to B* 
I I I I 
7. write out the virtual history of B* 
If v(N)=2, then a randomly chosen element of ZN* --- in particular, one tilat has been chosen by A 
interacting with a machine B* tilat does not" force" the outcome of any Blum coin-flips --- will have 
Jacobi symbol + 1 with probability 1/2; among these, quadratic residues will occur with probability 1/2. If 
B*, as a subprogram of the simulator MB"" does not "force" any (simulated) Blum coin-flips, then the 
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simulator generates elements of ZN with exactly the same probabilities, and then perfectly simulates the 
generating coin-Dips; on the other hand, if B· does "force" a coin-flip, then MB .. simply performs with it 
a sequence of Blum coin-flips, exactly as in the specification of the protocol. Eitller way, MB• generates 
lists of elements of ZN with the same distribution as do A and B·, and B * makes identical use of bits from 
its random tape, so that the sets VIEWB·{(A,B·)[N,h]} and M[N,h] are identical. This completes the 
proof for me third stage. 
Finally, to conclude the proof of Theorem 1, we see by the concatenation lemma that, given any input 
string at all, me concatenation of the three stages is a perfectly minimum-knowledge confirming 
interacLive proof-system for the language /1 (1/2(1/3 = /. 
QED 
6. Interactive Decision of Quadratic Residuosity 
If the confirming part of our protocol has been successfully completed, then with high probability the 
input string (N, z) is in the language I. In particular, we know that v(N) = 2, that z E ZN', and that (N) = + 1; 
these are the properties that are required of the inputs to the next palt of the protocol. 
This part is a deciding interactive proof-system for L, taking inputs from /. The proof-system is both 
perfectly minimum-knowledge and perfectly result-indistinguishable. As noted above, a pair (N,z) that is 
known to belong to / either is or is not also a member of L according to whether or not z is a quadratic 
residue mod N. 
To make me exposition clearer, we present three successive versions of our protocol. 
Lety=-l modN. Everything that folIows holds for any non-residue yE ZN* that has Jacobi symbol +1. 
As long as NE BLandN=lmod4, we can take y=-l. (Remark: If another non-residuey is desired, A 
can prove to B, as a preliminary sub-protocol stage, that y is a nonresidue by following the minimum-
knowledge interactive proof-system of [16].) 
Let us fix some notation. For any XE ZN* we define the predicate 
RES (x) = {O ifxis a.quadratic residue modN, 
N 1 otherwIse. 
Recall mat ZN'(+I) denotes the set of clements of ZN· with Jacobi symbol +1. Since v(N)=2, half of 
these are quadratic residues mod N, and half of them are non-residues. 
Our protocol relies on the fact that if rE ZN' is chosen at random, then ?modN is a random quadratic 
residue in the set ZN"(+I) and y?modN is a random quadratic non-residue in ZN*(+I): similarly, 
z?modN is either a random residue or a random non-residue in ZN *( + 1) according to whemer or not z is 
a residue mod N. 
This interactive proof-system has error probability 8(k) = 2e-4A181. 
First version: a deciding proof-system 
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i. Repeat k times: 
1. B chooses re ZN* and c e {1, 2, 3} at random, and computes CASE c of: 
1: x:=,2 modN 
2: x:= y? modN 
3: x:= z,2 modN 
B ---+ A: x 
2. A computes b:=RESN(x); 
A ---+ B: b 
3. B checks that if c= 1 then b=O, if c=2 then b= 1, and if c=3 then b is consistent 
with any previous case-3 iterations; if not then B REJECTs the proof and haItI) the 
protocol 
ii. B ACCEPTs the proof that RESN(z) is equal to the consistent value of b for case-3 iterations. 
As explained above, if z is a quadratic residue then x's constructed in case 1 are indistinguishable from 
x's constructed in case 3. If A acts as specified, then when tile protocol finishes B will be convinced that 
z is a residue. The only way that a cheating A· can convince B mat z is not a residue is by correctly 
guessing, among all iterations during which B has sent a residue x, which of these were constructed in 
case I and which of them in case 3; if there are ck such iterations in a particular execution of me protocol, 
then the probability of successful chcating is 2-ck. Since c is very likcly to be close Lo 2/3, a simple 
calculation using Bernstein's law of large numbers shows that the probability of successful cheating is at 
most 2e-4k/81. Similarly if z is a quadratic nonrcsidue. Hence the above version is a deciding interactive 
proof-system for L. 
However, this version is not result-indistinguishable. An observer of an execution of the protocol can 
easily tell whether he is watching an interactive proof mat RESN(z) = 1 or a proof that RESN(z)= ° by 
keeping a tally of me bits b sent by A in step 2 of each iteration. 
Second version: a result-indistinguishable proof-system 
A simple modification of the above protocol does hide the result from an eavesdropper. The only 
change is mat at the beginning (before step i), A flips a fair coin in order to decide whether to use 
R(x)=RESN(x) or R(x) = l-RESN(x) as the bit b to be sent to B in step 2 of each iteration throughout the 
protocol. R(x) can be regarded as an encoding, chosen at random for the entire protocol, of RESN(x). 
In step 3, B checks for consistency in the obvious way: B should receive the same bit b in all case-l 
iterations and the complementary bit in all case-2 iterations; B should receive a consistent bit b in all 
case-3 iterations, and its value indicates to B whether or not z is a quadratic residue. As before, if in step 
3 of any iteration B finds that the value of b is not consistent then B halts the protocol, REJECTing the 
proof. 
With tllis modification, the protocol is still --- arguing as above --- a deciding interactive proof-system 
for L. Furthermore, it is result-indistinguishable. An eavesdropper expects to overhear one bit about 2/3 
of me time during step 2 of each iteration and the complementary bit the remaining 1/3 of me time; 
whether me majority bit in a particular execution of me protocol is 0 or 1 gives him no knowledge. A 
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fonnal proof of result-indistinguishability of the full protocol is presented below. 
However, the version so far presented is not minimum-knowledge. For example, a cheating B" that 
wanted to find out whether a particular number --- 17, say --- is a quadratic residue mod N could. du~ng 
one of the iterations, send x= 17 in step 1 instead of an clement x constructed at random according to 'B's 
program. A's response in step 2 will convey to B* the value RES~17), which is something that B* could 
not have computed by itself. 
Third version: a minimum-knowledge result-indistinguishable proof-system 
We can make this a minimum-knowledge protocol by refining step 1 of the version just presented; the 
refmement consists of several interactive sub-steps by which B gives to A what amounts to a minimum-
knowledge proof that the element x that it sends was constructed in one of the three ways specified 
(without giving A any knowledge about which of the three ways). The rest of the protocol is unchanged. 
1.0 B chooses rE ZN* and CE {I, 2, 3} at random, and computes CASE C of: 
1: x:= ~modN 
2: x:= y~modN 
3: x:= z~modN 
B ~ A: x 
1.1 B chooses SjE ZN* at random (i= 1, ... ,4k) and computes: 
T1={t1 •... ,tkl tj=s?modN}, 
T2 = {tk+1, .... t2kl tj=ys?modN}, 
T3= {t2k+1,··· .t3kl tj=zs?modN}, 
T4 = { t3k+l' ...• t4kl tj=yzs? modN}: 
taking this to be a matrix of 4 rows [T1, T2, T3, T4] and k columns (where column j contains 
the elements t .• tk " t2k .• t3k .). B randomly pennutes each column of the matrix, resulting in ] +] +] +] 
a matrix T; 
B ~A: T 
1.2 A chooses s~{ 1, .... k} at random (a query indicating a random subset of Ts columns): 
A ~ B: S 
1.3 for eachj E S, for each tjE columnj, B ~ A: Sj 
(These numbers show A that B has correctly computed the /h column of T for each j E S, 
and convince A that it is very likely that at least one other column of T was also computed 
correctly.) 
1.4 A verifies (for each such t.) that t.= either S.2, YS.2, zs.2, or yzs.2 modN, with each congruence 
" I I I , 
being satisfied once in each columnj E S: 
if not, then A halts the protocol in the FAILURE state 
1.5 for each j e S, for each tjE columnj, B computes Wj according to the table below: if x was 
chosen as case C of step 1.0 and tjE TI' then Wj := the table-entry in the /th row and cth 
column; 
(For each j ~ S, these four numbers show A that if B has correctly computed the jth column 
of T, then B has correctly computed x.) 
for each such t., B ~ A: w. 
I I 
1.6 A verifies (for each such t.) that w.2 = eitJler (xt.), y(xt.). z(xt.), or yz(xt.)modN, witll each 
J J I " I 
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congruence being satisfied once in each columnj~ S; 
if not, then A halts the protocol in the FAILURE state 
The protocol now continues as before. A sends b=R(x) to B (step 2), and B checks b for consistency 
(step 3); and then they continue wi'th step 1 of the next iteration. Note that it is in A's "interest" to 
choose S at random in step 1.2, so that with overwhelming probability both S and {I, ... ,k)-S are 
reasonably large (and thus the probability that any particular column of T will be queried is close to 1/2). 
Table for Step 1.5 
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The idea is that any machine playing the role of B (and desiring that the protocol succeed) must follow 
the protocol, because if it tries to cheat during any iteration --- either by sending a number x in step 1.0 for 
which it does not' 'know" the corresponding number r, or by sending numbers tj in step 1.1 for which it 
does not "know" the corresponding numbers Sj --- then A will, with overwhelming probability, detect its 
cheating either in step 1.6 or in step 1.4. This is fOffilaIized in the following proof. 
Theorem 2: Given input belonging to 1= {(N,z) IN::1mod4,Ne BL,v(N)=2, (k)=+1), this 
protocol is a perfectly minimum-knowledge and perfectly result-indistinguishable deciding interactive 
proof-system for L = { (N, z) ell z a quadratic residue modN). 
Proof: First we prove that the protocol is a deciding proof-system for L. Since we have already shown 
that the second version presented above is a proof-system, it suffices to show that the refinement of step 1 
preserves this property. 
Suppose that z is a quadratic residue. The question is whether a cheating A· --- even if it does not 
choose S at random in step 1.2 --- can use the numbers sent by B during step 1 to correctly distinguish 
between case-1 iterations (x=?modN for a random r) and case-3 iterations (x=z?modN). Since B has 
25 
chosen them at random, A· is unable to distinguish between residues t. of the form s.2 and residues t. of 
I I I 
the form zs/. The sub-table corresponding to these four possibilities has rows that are permutations of 





Similarly for nonresidues tj of the form ys/ or yzs/. A like analysis holds if Z is a nonresidue mod N. 
Hence the protocol is indeed a deciding interactive proof-system for L. 
In order to prove the minimum-knowledge property, we choose an interactive Turing machine B· that 
runs in expected polynomial time; we must describe the computation of a simulating machine M = MB •• 
M has one-time access to an oracle for the result of the protocol, as explained in Section 3.1. M begins 
by querying the oracle on the input string (N,z), the initial history h, and B"'s random-tape string, and 
learns (with very high probability) the value of RESN(z). The rest of the simulation is similar to that of 
the proof that the protocol of [16] is minimum-knowledge. 
As its next step, M flips a coin to simulate A's choice of whether to compute R(x) = RESN(x) or 
R(x) = I-RESN(x) during the protocol. 
In each iteration, M carries on the protocol through the end of (the refinement of) step 1 in a 
straightfolward manner: Muses B" to perfonn its own version of B's role, and M easily simulates A's 
role, choosing a random query S in step 1.2 and checking several congruences mod N in steps 1.4 and 1.6. 
If these congruences do satisfy the check, the difficulty comes in simulating A's communication in step 2, 
which consists of the bit R(x); how can M quickly calculate the correct value of RESN(x)? M 
accomplishes this by following the EXTRACfION procedure described below. 
After B' has performed its computations in the simulation of step 1.1 and "sent" the matrix T, M saves 
the current configuration Co of B O • At this point, given Co (which includes a fixed random-tape string) 
and any fixed query-set S~ {I, ... ,k} that A might choose in step 1.2, the lists of numbers that B· would 
., send" in steps 1.3 and 1.5 in answer to the query S are detem1ined. Let us call S a satisfiable query if 
these answers would satisfy A's verifying checks of steps 1.4 and 1.6, causing the protocol to continue 
with step 2. (A query that is not satisfiable would cause A to halt the protocol in its failure state.) It is 
easy to check whether or not a query S is satisfiable, by setting B·'s configuration to Co' "sending" S to 
B·, and checking the num bers that B 0 "sends" in return. 
In its simulation, M makes use of an auxiliary matrix 1" that conlains two data fields for each entry ti of 
the matrix T, one for the number s. and one for the number w. (where s. and w. arc related to t. as in the 
I ""
specification of the protocol). Note ~hat if M succeeds in filling both fields for any single entry ti' then M 
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can easily deduce the value R(x) that it needs in order to simulate step 2: M can use s. to see how t. was 
I I 
computed in step 1.1 (Le. which set T. contains t., and hence which row of the table B* must use in step J I 
1.5): next M can use Wi to see which column c of the table B* must use; and then the choice of column 
gives M the value of RESN(x) , and hence of R(x). 
Next we describe the EXTRACTION procedure that M performs in each iteration following the 
simulation of step 1.1. 
1. save the current machine configuration Co 
2. choose a query S~{l, ... ,k} at random, store it, and "send" it to B'" (simulating step 1.2) 
3. let B* "send" its answers to S (the numbers s. of step 1.3 and w., of step 1.5), and check the 
I I 
congruences of steps 1.4 and 1.6; 
if the congruences do not check, then halt the simulation: 
otherwise, store B'"'s answers in the auxiliary matrix T and repeat the following two loops 
concurrently until success: 
a. sampling the query space (without repetition): 
L restore configuration Co 
ii. choose a new query S' ~ {I, ... ,k} at random that has not already been 
chosen (if there is one; ifnone exists, then halt the sampling loop); 
store S' and "send" it to B* 
iii. let BOO "send" its answers to S' 
iv. for each j= 1 ... kif B*'s answers for column j of the matrix T satisfy the 
congruences of 1.4 (if j E S') or of 1.6 (if j f£ S'), then enter them in the 
auxiliary matrix T; 
if any of these new entries is an si for which T already contains Wi or vice 
versa then (as explained above) use s., w. to compute R(x) and set 
I I 
success := TR UE 
b. use any factoring algorithm F to factor N: 
i. until (success or (F has successfully factored N}) do the next step of F 
iL use the prime factors of N to compute RESN(x) and R(x), and set 
success:= TRUE 
4. restore configuration Co and "send" to BOO the original query S 
5. let B* "send" its answers and update its history tape (exactly as it did the first time it 
received the query S) 
Simulating step 2, M sets b:=R(x) (as computed either in a or b of the last inner loop) and . 'sends" b to 
B*, which performs its version of step 3 of the protocol. If B* is following the instructions of step 3, then 
it is indeed' 'expecting" the computed value of b, and the simulation continues with the next iteration. 
We need to show that M's expected running time is polynomial (in k, the length of the input), and that 
its output ensemble is identical to B'"'s view. To bound the running time, it suffices to prove a 
polynomial bound on the expected time required by each of the k iterations of M' s program. First observe 
that tl1e outer loop of ilie EXTRACTION procedure takes polynomial time. The same is true for any single 
execution of the inner loop: queries may be stored in a lexicographically ordered tree (so iliat choosing a 
new one costs 0 (k)); the rest of the sampling loop is polynomial-time, and in each inner loop only one 
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step of the factoring algorithm is perfOImed. Therefore, it is enough to show that, for any fixed 
configuration Co' the expected number of repetitions of the inner loop is polynomial in k. 
In fact. we show that this number is constant. In configuration Co' let p (O~p~2") be the number of 
queries that are satisfiable. When M performs the EXTRACTION procedure, with probability l-p/2k its 
first query S will not be satisfiable, in which case the inner loop is not executed at all. If p=O, we have no 
other case to consider; so assume p ~ 1. With probability pl2k , S is satisfiable, and the inner loop is 
repeated until success is set to TRUE (either in the sampling process or after factoring N). Each sampling 
loop begins with the choice of a new random query. Of the 2k-I possible queries, at least the p-I 
satisfiable queries (besides S) lead to success: that is, the probability of a successful inner loop is at least 
7'. Hence if p> 1, the expected number of attempts after choosing a satisfiable original query is at most 
2 -, 
k k 
2 ~': over all, the expected number of repetitions of the inner loop is at most Pk • 2 -,' ~ 2. We consider Jr 2 Jr 
below the special case p= 1. 
Next, we show that the sets VIEW B* (A,B*)[(N, z), h]} and M[(N, z), h) are identical; following Remark 
2 of Section 3.2, it suffices to show that this is so for anyone of the k iterations of the protocol. Consider, 
therefore, an iteration --- either of an actual protocol execution by A and B* or of the simulation by M ---
at the beginning of which B* sends the matrix T, and let p (O~p ~2") be the number of satisfiable queries. 
With probability I-p/2k a randomly chosen query is not satisfiable, causing either the protocol execution 
or the simulation to halt: in this case, the actual history and the virtual history are identical. If p=O, then 
tltis is the only case that occurs. Otherwise, with probability p/2k, the original query S is satisfiable, and 
both the actual protocol and the simulation continue with step 2. As long as p~2, there is at least one 
other query that leads to success in the inner loop of M's EXTRACfION procedure, enabling M to "send" 
in its simulation of step 2 the correct value of b = R(x) , the same one that A would send during an actual 
execution. The factoring algorithm may be faster then the sampling process, in which case tlle correct 
value of b is computed directly. Either way, the actual history and the virtual history arc identical. 
If p=l, then the probability that M's original query is satisfiable is only 2-k• In this rare case, the 
sampling process in the inner loop of the EXTRACTION procedure might never lead to success: the inner 
loop might not terminate until after N has been factored. Since the cost of factoring N is less than 0 (2,,), 
the total expected number of repetitions of the inner loop when p= 1 is less than r k·2k = 1. In this case, as 
before, the actual history and the virtual history are identical. Thls concludes the proof that the protocol is 
perfectly minimum-knowledge. 
In order to prove that the protocol is result-indistinguishable, we must specify the computation of a 
probabilistic Turing machine M', running in expected polynomial time, that simulates the 
communications ensemble COM{(A,B)[N,zj}. (Recall thal M' does not have access to any oracle.) M' 
begins by flipping a coin to decide whetl1er to simulate the choice R(z) = 0 or tl1e choice R(z) = 1. Then in 
each iteration M' simulates the specified computations of A and B, except for the following changes. In 
(simulated) step 1.0, M' chooses x:=z?modN with probability 2/3 and x:=yz?modN with probability 
1/3. In (simulated) step 2, M' outputs b=R(z) if x=z? and b= I-R(z) if x=yz? (Here lhe simulation of 
step 2 is much simpler than in the minimum-knowledge proof above, since M' "knows" how each x was 
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The numbers x output by M' have the same distribution as the numbers x output by B; the same is true 
of the Sj and the Wj' Hence, as required, the set of outputs M'[N, z] is identical to the set 
COM ( (A, B)[N, z]), so the protocol is perfectly result-indistinguishable. 
As presented, the protocol takes 0 (k) communication rounds, during which 0 (12) bits are exchanged. 
However, all k iterations of the main loop can be performed in parallel, taking 0(1) rounds. The 
simulator M can perform in parallel all k iterations of its main loop, and its expected running time is still 
polynomial in k. Similarly, M' can operate in parallel. Thus the parallelized version of the protocol is 
also perfectly minimum-knowledge and perfectly result-indistinguishable. This concludes the proof of 
Theorem 2. 
QED 
We note that there is another modification of the first version of our protocol that also achieves result-
indistinguishability. A can always respond in step 2 with the true value of RESix) if B computes each x 
in step 1 according to a random choice among four varieties: to the types ?-, y?-, and z?-modN we add the 
fourtll type yz?-modN. If the protocol is to be minimum-knowledge as well, we can refine step 1 as in 
the third version of our protocol, adding an appropriate fourth column to the table used to compute Wi' 
7. Cryptographic Applications 
In all our applications, we let N be the public key of a user A who knows its factorization. Within the 
set N, it is most advantageous to A to choose N to be of the form N = pq. with p and q of approximately 
the same size. A can follow our confirming protocol in order to prove to any other user that N E BL and 
v(N)=2. For these applications, we assume that the residuosity problem is intractable. 
When A communicates with another user B, any element ZE ZN*(+l) can serve as an encoding of the 
bit RESiz), as soon as A has used our protocol to prove to B the value of this bit. According to need, z 
can be chosen by A or by both A and B together (say, by flipping coins). Because of the result-
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indistinguishability of the protocol, this encoding is cryptographically secure. 
In contrast, the conventional approach to hiding knowledge from an eavesdropper is to use encryption. 
(For example, given two different protocols, one for membership in a language L and the other for 
non-membership in L, one could "pad" the protocols so that they both caused messages of the same 
length to be sent at each round of communications, and then encrypt all messages.) However. in this 
approach. proving a theorem about the security of the protocol against eavesdroppers usually requires an 
assumption about the security of the encryption scheme used. 
Thus a sequence of random numbers z1' z2' .... zk can serve as a probabilistic encryption [15] of the 
bit-sequence RESJz1)' RESN(z2)' ... , RESN(z~, which in tum can be used as a one-time pad. sent either 
from A to B or from B to A. 
Instead of using the zi directly to encrypt the bits RESJz), we can define a much more efficient 
scheme for probabilistic encryption by using the sequence RESN(z1)' RESN(z2)' .... RESJz~ as the 
random seed for a cryptographically secure pseudo-random bit generator [5. 24. 6] whose security may be 
based on the unknown factorization of N (e.g. [3.4]). Sharing the seed. A and B can efficiently generate 
polynomiaUy many bilS and use them as a (very long) one-lime pad with which to send messages back 
and forth. The pad bits alone are secure against any polynomially bounded adversary; furt11ermore. the 
adversary gains no computational advantage in guessing any pad bit when he is given probabilistic 
encryptions of the bits of the seed, nor when he is allowed to overhear the protocol interactions that define 
these encrypted bits. Because our protocol is only used in order to initialize the system. this scheme has 
low amortized cost. 
Whether the bits RESN(z) are used directly or to form the seed of a pseudom-random bit generator. the 
resulting schemes have the minimum-knowledge property with respect to B as well as with respect to an 
eavesdropper C. In particular. they are provably secure against both chosen-message and chosen-
ciphertext attack. For further study of the power that interaction seems to add to public-key cryptography. 
see [10]. 
Another application of our protocol gives a new private unbiased coin-Dip. generated jointly by A and 
B. The two users simply choose z at random --- for example. choosing its bilS by means of Blum's 
coin-flip. Note that the bits of z are public; it is RESN(z). the result of the coin-Dip, which is private. 
In certain applications we can omit the confirming proof that N is of the required form. Suppose in fact 
that N has more than two prime factors. For any ZE ZN*C+l), A can carry out the deciding protocol as 
before. Now, however, ify and z --- both quadratic nonresidues in ZN*C+l) --- have different quadratic 
character modulo several of the prime factors of N, then A can distinguish numbers of the form ?- from 
numbers of the form y?-modN. and can distinguish each of tllese from numbers of the form z?-modN. 
(This is not true ifv(N)=2; recall that for such N any nonresidue in ZN*(+l) is a nonresidue modulo both 
prime factors of N.) Thus A can. at will, use our deciding protocol to "prove" to B either that z is a 
residue or that z is a nonresidue. In either case. the interactively proved value of RESN(z) --- whether or 
not it is the true value --- is cryptographically secure. This value gives B no knowledge whatever. The 
"proof' only convinces B that A can distinguish between numbers with different quadratic characters 
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mod N, without releasing to B any information about the quadratic character mod N of any particular 
number. (This can be formalized in terms of a simulator M = MB• for any given verifier B*. Note that at 
the beginning of the program for M !,riven in the proof of Theorem 2, we can replace the oracle query for 
RESiz) with a simple coin-flip; then exactIy as in that proof, the two sets VIEWB• {(A,B·)[(N, z), II]} and 
M[(N, z), h] are identical.) Thus, we may say that in this case, the protocol is result-indistinguishable even 
with respect to B. 
In this situation, when N has more than two prime factors, we can define the following game: A picks a 
random nonresidue z with quadratic character different from that of y. A then "proves" to user B} that 
RESiz)=bl, and "proves" to user B2 that RESN(z)=b2. The "proven" value of RESN(z) in each 
execution of the protocol is shared only by the prover A and the verifier B] or B2. In fact, user B} has 
absolutely no computational advantage in deciding whether or not b1=b2, and neither does user B2. 
8. Conclusions 
Approaching knowledge from the point of view of computational complexity, we have studied the 
interactive transmission of computational results. The protocol that we introduce gives a proof of the 
value, 0 or 1, of a number-theoretic predicate, RESN(·). In a sense that we make precise (extending the 
definitions of [16]), the verifier gains no more knowledge from an execution of the protocol than this 
value; this is the "minimum-knowledge" property of the protocol. Funhem10re, we are able to analyze 
the difference between the knowledge gained by the active verifier and that gained by a passive 
eavesdropper of equal computational power; the protocol is "result-indistinguishable", in that an 
eavesdropper gains no knowledge at all by overhearing the messages passed during an execution. As a 
formalization of the notion of a cryptosystem's privacy and security against any passive attack, the 
minimum-knowledge property seems to be the strongest possible. 
Recent work on minimum-knowledge protocols has taken several different directions. Feige, Fiat, and 
Sharnir adapted the result-indistinguishable protocol of this paper (originally presented in [11]) and the 
protocols of [16] in order to give an efficient minimum-knowledge (and therefore cryptographically 
secure) identification scheme [9]. Their paper proposes a fom1alization of the notion that a protocol can 
supply a "proof' that the prover knows some fact or possesses some computational ability, while 
completely hiding this piece of knowledge. (For example, in case N has more than two prime factors, our 
deciding proof-system for RESi') may be regarded as demonstrating the prover's ability to distinguish 
between numbers with different quadratic characters mod N; see Section 7). 
Goldreich, Micali, and Wigderson proved that. under the assumption that one-way functions exist, 
every language in NP has a minimum-knowledge confirming interactive proof-system; tillS result has 
important consequences for the design of cryptographic protocols [13]. Under the assumption that certain 
number-theoretic computations are infeasible, a similar result was proved by Brassard and Crepeau. both 
for prover and verifier as described in this paper [7], and for the dual situation in which a resource-
bounded prover interacts with a verifier of unlimited computational power [8]. Impagliazzo and Yung 
gave a construction for the direct minimum-knowledge transfer of the result of any given computation 
(both for the usual and for the dual model of the computational power of the prover and the verifier). 
under the more general assumption that any of a large class of one-way functions exist [18]. 
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In a recent paper, instead of considering only protocols for transferring a computational result from one 
party to another, Yao studied a broad class of two-party protocols for what may be called' . cryptographic 
computation", in which the (polynomially bounded) users combine their plivate inpuL<; in order to 
compute private outputs in a minimum-knowledge fashion, preserving the privacy of these inputs and 
outputs and hiding partial computational results as much as possible; it may also be required that both 
users compute their fmal results simultaneously [25]. Under the assumption that factoring is hard, Yao 
showed how to design such a protocol for any given cryptographic computation problem. Continuing this 
work, Goldreich, Micali, and Wigderson proved similar results for multi-party protocols, assuming that 
one-way functions exist, and showed how such protocols could be made to tolerate faults [14]. Galil, 
Haber. and Yung simplified and extended these constructions for cryptographic computation, giving new 
methods for the design of fault-tolerant multi-party cryptographic protocols [12]. 
In summary, the complexity-theoretic approach to measuling and controlling the knowledge 
transmitted in various distributed and cryptographic settings has proved to be a useful tool in protocol 
design. 
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